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I propose analysing the dynamics of income positions using dynamic panel ordered probit 
models. I disentangle, simultaneously, the roles of state dependence and heterogeneity 
(observed and non-observed) in explaining income position persistence, such as poverty 
persistence and affluence persistence. I apply my approach to Chile exploiting 
longitudinal data from the P-CASEN 2006–2009. First, I find that income position mobility 
at the bottom and the top of the income distribution is much higher than the expected, 
showing signs of high economic insecurity. Second, the observable individual 
characteristics have a much stronger impact than true state dependence to explain 
individuals’ current income position in the income distribution extremes.  
 
Keywords: Longitudinal data, poverty persistence, affluence persistence, income 
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In the last two decades, inequality has been changing in different regions of the world. 
While most of the OECD countries have experienced an increase in income inequality, in 
regions such as Latin America, though the starting point was much higher than in the 
OECD, income inequality has decreased (Amarante & Colacce, 2018; OECD, 2015). 
These increases or decreases in inequality can occur in different income mobility 
contexts. For example, a country may have a simple stretch or shrinkage of the ends of 
the income distribution where households remain in the same position within the 
distribution. However, longitudinal data have shown that changes in inequality are 
explained, in relative terms, by the movement of households up and down within the 
income distribution (Fields, 2008; Jäntti & Jenkins, 2015). 
 
Although this high mobility of income may be associated with greater economic insecurity 
(Jarvis & Jenkins, 1998), for any society a desirable objective is to prevent poor 
households from remaining stuck in their condition over time. The aim is for a type of 
income mobility that will allow these households to stay out of poverty for long periods. 
Conversely, a society may want to prevent those households at the top of the income 
distribution from remaining the same, generating barriers for others to move up as well. 
As Krugman (1992) puts it, “an increase in income mobility tends to make the distribution 
of lifetime income more equal, since those who are rich have nowhere to go but down, 
while those who are poor have nowhere to go but up”.  
 
A recent study used longitudinal household panel surveys from OECD countries to 
measure the intragenerational income mobility in the last two decades (OECD, 2018b). It 
found that there is currently a greater persistence in the income positions than what was 
found by the end of the nineties. However, it has not been studied in depth why individuals 
stay longer in the same position in the distribution of income. To answer this question, it 
is necessary to know if the income persistence is explained by the characteristics of the 
individual (observable and non-observable) or by the mere fact of being in a certain 
income position (state dependence). In other regions of the world, such as Latin America, 
the shortage of longitudinal household surveys has resulted in a lack of knowledge about 
income mobility levels. The exception that confirms the rule are the works that used the 
panel data from Chile with three waves over a decade (1996–2001–2006).  These works 
show that the unequal income distribution in Chile contrasts with the high mobility of all 
but those at the high-end of the income distribution (Contreras, Cooper, Herman, & 
Neilson, 2005; Sapelli, 2013). 
In this paper, I study one specific dimension of the intragenerational income mobility in 
Chile. It is known in the literature as ‘positional movement’, which measures the 
movement of individuals across different positions (quintiles, deciles, or ranks) in the 
income distribution. In particular, I analyse the ‘origin independence’, which measures 




whether an individual’s position in the income distribution affects their chances of 
overcoming poverty or remaining at the top of the income distribution. To do that, I use 
four rounds of the Socioeconomic Household Panel Survey (P-CASEN) for the period 
between 2006 and 2009. 
 
Based on this mobility concept, a most desirable type of society would be one where the 
income mobility is high and the current position of an individual in the income distribution 
does not depend on his/her previous position. It should be mentioned that when a society 
has high fluidity but inadequate or insufficient social protection, the well-being of the 
population can be affected by the stress or anxiety generated by economic uncertainty. 
However, this issue cannot be addressed just by looking into income mobility, it requires 
studying economic insecurity using a different empirical framework (Hacker, 2018).  
 
Studying the ‘positional movement’ of mobility will enable me to: i) generate transition 
matrices of entry and exit of both poverty rates and affluence rates, and ii) understand the 
mechanisms that explain why households at the lower-end of the income distribution have 
a low probability of moving up, and those that at the higher-end of the income distribution 
have little chance of moving down. Therefore, the dual objective of this paper is to 
measure the persistence at the bottom and at the top of the income distribution, and to 
break down the persistence observed at both ends of the income distribution into the 
components that can be attributed to state dependence and non-observed heterogeneity 
as well as to the effects of the observed characteristics of individuals and households. 
 
The contributions of this research are three. First, I use econometric strategies to model 
joint low-income persistence and high-income persistence. Existing studies have 
primarily focused on analysing only one end of the income distribution, estimating the 
state dependence effect in poverty persistence (e.g. Giarda & Moroni, 2018). For a review 
of these studies see Biewen (2014). I use a random effect dynamic ordered probit model 
that takes into account the state dependence of previous income position, individual 
heterogeneity, and unobserved heterogeneity. It also controls for the initial condition 
problem (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2013; Wooldridge, 2005) and the possible 
correlation between random effects and time-varying explanatory variables 
(Chamberlain, 1984; Mundlak, 1978). Second, I provide an answer to the question on 
why people in Chile who have been on a low income or a high income are more likely to 
persist in the same position in the income distribution in the future. Until now, to the best 
of my knowledge, no studies in the literature have analysed the causes of the persistence 
both at the bottom and at the top of the income distribution in any Latin American country.  
 
Third, I perform two robustness checks to validate the results concerning attrition bias. 
When I use the P-CASEN to analyse low-income/high-income persistence, there is a risk 




of getting biased results due to non-random attrition. Not considering attrition may result 
in misleading estimates of income position persistence. I test whether or not attrition is 
correlated with the dependent variables applying variable-addition tests proposed in 
Verbeek & Nijman (1992). Also, I use inverse probability weights to adjust for attrition to 
compare weighted estimates and unweighted estimates from the baseline model to 
determine whether attrition bias has a significant effect on the estimated coefficients of 
interest (Wooldridge, 2002b). 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.  In section 2, I provide an overview 
of the relevant literature about intragenerational income mobility and income position 
persistence. In Section 3, I describe the datasets and definitions. In section 4, I present 
the descriptive statistics and transition matrices. In section 5, I introduce the econometric 
model (REDOP) and estimation strategy that I followed. In section 6, I show and discuss 




The economic literature has debated for several decades whether or not greater income 
mobility represents a social improvement (Atkinson, Bourguignon, & Morrisson, 1992). 
The positive view understands high income mobility as a sign of dynamism, social mobility 
and equal opportunities compared to a more rigid society (Friedman, 1962). A critical 
interpretation of high income mobility is the economic insecurity that is generated in the 
households that are exposed to fluctuations in households’ income (Jarvis & Jenkins, 
1998).  
 
This discussion is not foreign to emerging economies such as Chile. Two studies have 
analysed income mobility for the periods 1996-2001, and 1996-2006 in Chile using a 
panel survey of three rounds (Contreras et al., 2005; Sapelli, 2013). Both studies found 
high mobility, although they differ in their interpretation. While Sapelli (2013) considers 
that high levels of income mobility are desirable because they imply that the lowest 
income has a high probability of rising up the income ladder and episodes of income 
reduction are transitory, Contreras et al. (2005) relate this high mobility to greater 
vulnerability to poverty since the unanticipated income fluctuations or shocks are socially 
undesirable considering that the median income is not very far from the official poverty 
line in Chile. 
 




The current debate about whether or not a society with high income mobility is desirable 
has incorporated the different dimensions of mobility in the discussion.1 In this way, the 
answer to whether a fluid society is preferable to a rigid society will depend on the concept 
of income mobility that is being studied (Jäntti & Jenkins, 2015). For instance, when using 
inter-temporal dependency as a mobility concept, a society with high mobility is desirable, 
as individuals’ current income does not depend on their previous income. From an 
intergenerational perspective, when measuring income mobility using the concept of 
positional movement, a more fluid society is also preferable. In this type of society, the 
richest can become less rich and the poorest can become less poor. When using the 
same concept in an intra-generational analysis, this preference is not so clear because 
the mobility of income is also explained by the life cycle of individuals. 
 
In this same line of argument, in which the preference regarding income mobility levels 
within a society depends on the concept used, it is possible to find that income mobility 
can reduce inequality in the long term, but from the perspective of mobility as income risk, 
that would not be socially beneficial. From the perspective of income risk, if mobility 
occurs in a context of economic shocks where income fluctuations cannot be predicted 
at the individual level, generating economic uncertainty (mobility as income risk), a high 
mobility of income would not be desirable. Additionally, applying different concepts of 
mobility to compare countries also gives us different answers about the level of income 
mobility. For example, income mobility is more rigid in the UK than in the U.S.A. if the 
dependence on current income from the past is used as a mobility concept, but the UK 
has more mobility than the U.S. if mobility is measured as changes in the individuals’ 
position within the income distribution (Fields, 2008). 
 
In order to analyse income persistence, I use the concept of income mobility known as 
positional income mobility, which takes into account the position in the previous period. A 
recent study that used this definition of mobility for country members of the OECD found 
that income persistence is stronger at the bottom and, in particular, the top of the income 
distribution, where respectively 60 per cent and 70 per cent of individuals stay over four 
years (OECD, 2018b). This translates into both lower chances of moving upwards for 
those at the bottom, and lower chances of moving down for those at the top. For emerging 
countries the lack of mobility is more pronounced at the bottom of the income distribution 
(OECD, 2018b). 
 
1 Since the concept of mobility has multiple dimensions several types of indicators are needed to measure 
it. This partly explains why, in the last 40 years, at least twenty indicators have been proposed to study 
income mobility (Atkinson, 1970; Chakravarty, Dutta, & Weymark, 1985; Fields, 2001; Fields & Ok, 1999; 
Hart, 1976; Shorrocks, 1978). The works of Jenkins (2011) and Fields (2008, 2010) have made an important 
contribution to organising the discussion and relating these indicators to different mobility dimensions such 
as positional change, individual income growth, reduction of longer-term inequality, and income risk. 





There is extensive literature that has focused on the analysis of income mobility at the 
bottom of the income distribution. Individual persisting in their poverty situation, known as 
poverty traps, have been studied in developed countries (Andriopoulou & Tsakloglou, 
2011; Ayllón, 2013; Biewen, 2014; Devicienti, 2011; Giarda & Moroni, 2018), as well as 
in developing countries (Alem, 2015; Bigsten & Shimeles, 2008; Thomas & Gaspart, 
2014).2 The empirical evidence from these studies, for both type of societies, shows that 
those who have been in poverty have a high probability of experiencing it again in future 
periods. 
 
Two mechanisms explain the influence of time on the persistence of poverty. First, the 
experience of poverty in one year per se raises the risk of being poor in the next year. 
This process is called true state dependence or the ‘scarring effect’. In other words, the 
fact of experiencing poverty – independent of other factors – has a real causal impact on 
future poverty (Heckman, 1981). The literature suggests two possible explanations 
behind true state dependence in poverty. According to Biewen (2009), a low income may 
be associated with adverse incentives such as moral hazard (e.g. no willingness to search 
for jobs so to not lose the economic benefits of the unemployment insurance). In addition 
to these work disincentives, negative duration dependence in poverty can be explained 
by vicious circle processes, which make the search for a new job more complicated. For 
example, the absence of counselling and training or a demoralising attitude towards work 
explained by the habituation or stigmatisation of being jobless (Devicienti, 2011). 
 
The second mechanism is known as individual heterogeneity. This means that people 
who remain in poverty for longer may possess similar characteristics that hinder their exit 
of the poverty spell. These features may be observable (e.g. educational level, 
unemployment, health problems) or unobservable (e.g. lack of cognitive skills, low 
motivation). Therefore, being poor with these characteristics over time increases the risk 
of being poor in the future. In other words, poverty is unrelated to the duration of the 
poverty spell.  
 
Although high-income persistence has not been studied as much as the persistence of 
poverty, there are authors who argue that the high end of the income distribution can 
show even more persistence (Solon, 2017). Affluence shields have the same effect as 
poverty traps, this is, an individual’s current position in the highest income group 
increases their probability of remaining in the same position in the future. There is 
extensive sociological literature on the barriers to entry to the upper classes (e.g. the 
 
2 Poverty persistence has also been studied for groups of the population as households with children 
(Bárcena-Martín, Blanco-Arana, & Perez-Moreno, 2017; Fabrizi & Mussida, 2020; Jenkins, Schluter, & 
Wagner, 2003). 




professionals and managers’ class, to use Erikson and Goldthorpe’s (1992) definition). 
Some barriers emerge from the ownership of different types of assets, such as property, 
sectoral barriers, or authority in the workplace (Torche, 2015). Other mechanisms that 
reproduce the upper classes are mediated by getting educational credentials (Ishida, 
Muller, & Ridge, 1995) or their peers and social network  (DiMaggio & Garip, 2012). 
 
Reeves (2017) calls this process opportunity hoarding among the top of the income 
distribution. He argues that the parents of the upper middle class of the United States (the 
top 20 percent on the income distribution) have successfully managed to ensure that their 
children maintain the same status and position in the income distribution, which has 
resulted in a reduction in the overall intergenerational mobility. According to Reeves, 
mechanisms such as zoning laws and schooling, occupational licensing, college 
application procedures, and the allocation of internships have allowed the highest quintile 
of American society to build a glass floor that not only protects their children from falling 
in the income distribution when they are older but also prevents others who were born in 
a lower position from crossing the glass roof that has been built, thus generating a society 
with less social mobility. 
 
There are several modelling approaches to studying the persistence of someone’s 
income position. In general, these methods have focused on studying only low income 
and not the upper part of the income distribution. See Aassve et al. (2006) for a complete 
review. Each approach is associated with a specific methodology, as they rely on different 
definitions of income mobility related to the poverty line. Some of these are, for instance, 
chronic versus transient poverty, consecutive periods in poverty, or years in poverty 
during a fixed timeframe (Jenkins, 2011). One of these approaches is known as the 
components of variance model. It focuses on estimating the permanent and transitory 
components of poverty as well as the determinants of both types of deprivation. One of 
the first works in this line of research was carried out by Lillard and Willis (1978), in which 
they captured the dynamics of income through a complex structure of the error term. Once 
the dynamic model has been estimated, the frequency and duration of periods of poverty 
are calculated. 
 
A disadvantage of the component approach is that all of the deviations that are captured 
by transitory poverty are considered as if they were random and therefore equivalent. 
However, as Bane and Ellwood (1986) observed, the changes in income over time neither 
lead to the same long-term dynamics, nor are they random. For example, the trajectories 
of future income of a person that falls into poverty due to a job loss may not be equivalent 
to the income trajectory of a person suffering due to a negative health shock. These 
authors propose a different approach known as hazard rate models. These consist in 
analysing on their own merit the deviations or changes in income over time, by examining 




the duration of the periods in poverty, the odds of exiting and re-entering this state and 
the events associated with these transitions (Bane & Ellwood, 1986; Stevens, 1994). One 
of the main contributions of this approach to the study of poverty dynamics is that it shows 
that the longer people persist on a low income the lower their chances of exiting poverty 
(Arranz & Cantó, 2012; Biewen, 2009; Cellini, McKernan, & Ratcliffe, 2008; Jenkins, 
2011). 
 
However, the problem with these models is that they do not consider the fact that 
individuals in poverty in the first interview, as well as in the sample attrition, are not 
randomly distributed. Markov models of transition to poverty – first-order models – do 
control the initial conditions of individuals and the attrition, allowing for predicting rates of 
poverty, rates of escaping and entering poverty, and the length of time of remaining in 
poverty for individuals with different characteristics (Cappellari & Jenkins, 2004). 
 
There is a fourth methodology that can be used to analyse poverty dynamics, which has 
some overlapping features with the others; it is known as dynamic discrete choice models. 
These models are designed to measure the two mechanisms that explain the influence 
of time on the persistence of poverty: i) the true state dependence, and ii) the observed 
and unobserved individual heterogeneity. These models assume that poverty follows a 
first order Markov process. This means that if an individual remains for two consecutive 
years below the poverty line then it is possible to confirm that there is poverty persistence. 
To do that, the models have to distinguish the true state dependence captured by the 
impact of the lagged dependent variable from the spurious state dependence caused by 
the presence of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
This last approach is the one that I use here. However, since the outcome in this research 
is not a poor/non-poor dichotomous category but rather considers the categories for 
poor/middle class/affluent in the income distribution, it requires working with Random 
Effect Dynamic Ordered Probit (REDOP) models. In doing so I have to deal with three 
issues: i) the correlated individual effects (persistence may be partially explained as being 
due to individual observed and unobserved heterogeneity rather than true state 
dependence), ii) the initial conditions problem (the observed start of the Markov process 
does not coincide with the true start of the process) and iii) the attrition bias (the variables 
affecting attrition might be correlated with the underlying income mobility process under 
study).  To deal with the correlated individual effects and the initial condition problem, I 
adopt the approach suggested by Wooldridge (2005) and modified by Rabe-Hesketh & 
Skrondal (2013). And, to assess whether attrition bias is a problem in my REDOP models, 
I apply variable addition tests (Verbeek & Nijman, 1992) and I compare estimated 
coefficients of interest variables between pooled model with inverse probability weights 




and without weights (Wooldridge, 2002b). Further details on the methodological strategy 
I used are explained in section 5. 
 
3. Data and definitions   
 
The dataset I use is the Chilean Socioeconomic Household Panel Survey (P-CASEN) for 
the years 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009.3 The P-CASEN provides longitudinal data on the 
socioeconomic conditions of the Chilean population at a household and individual level 
(Observatorio Social, 2011).   
 
The final national sample consists of 8,079 households, comprising a total of 30,104 
individuals. Each person in the original sample was followed and re-interviewed 
consecutively at a time interval of about one year. In the analyses I used both a balanced 
sample that contains information about the individuals that were interviewed in the four 
rounds, and an unbalanced sample that takes advantage of all available observations. 
The response rate between wave 1 and wave 2 was 73 percent, and for the following 
waves the attrition was 11 and 10 percent respectively. The balanced database has 
18,065 individuals (adults and children) present in each of the four waves. The attrition of 
the sample will be discussed in more detail later. 
 
The P-CASEN contains a wide range of economic and sociodemographic variables, 
which are available for each round. I use characteristics of the head of household and 
characteristics of the household in the multivariate analysis. The head of the household 
is defined as the person in the household who contributes the most with her salary to the 
household income. In the case of a workless household, the household head is the self-
reported household head in the survey. In keeping with previous studies on income 
distribution that use household survey data, the covariates are defined at the level of the 
head of household. Therefore, in the analysis I use a sample of households. The 
methodological reason for not including children is that they do not make decisions that 
cause changes to the household’s income mobility. In the case of adults, the reason is 
not to replicate the information of the head of household in the econometric models. 
 
I use an income perspective to study the income position persistence of poor and affluent 
populations, which means that people’s well-being is captured in terms of income. I 
construct post-transfer monthly household income based on the sum of income from 
 
3 For more information on the Panel CASEN, see: 
http://observatorio.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/enc_panel.php  




labour, assets, imputed rent, private transfers and public transfers.4 It is worth noting that 
November was the reference month for income questions in each wave. In general, 
household surveys in Latin American countries, including Chile, collect income for official 
poverty and inequality measures using a monthly reference period to build these 
measures (e.g. ECLAC, 2019). All income has been converted to November 2009 prices 
to compare with real income. 
 
Recognizing that there is no single way to define low income or poverty nor to define high 
income or affluence, I use both relative and absolute cut-offs to identify both groups at 
the extremes of the income distribution. First, for the relative measure, to identify the 
poverty line I use the threshold that determines the first income quintile group for each 
wave, and for the affluence line, I use the cut-off that identifies the fifth income quintile 
group. These types of thresholds capture relative poverty and affluence. I applied both 
cut-offs to the equivalised total household income. Equivalization allows for comparison 
between individuals from different sized households. To equivalise incomes I use the 
scale that divides total household income by the square root of household size (Buhmann, 
Rainwater, Schmaus, & Smeeding, 1988). This equivalization allows me to compare 
some of the results I obtained with those from studies that also use these relative income 
cut-offs to analyse OECD countries (CASE & III, 2018; OECD, 2018a). 
 
Second, for the absolute cut-offs, to identify poor households, I use the international 
poverty line suggested by the World Bank for upper-middle-income countries in Latin 
America (US $ 5.5 per person per day in 2011 PPP). To identify the affluent group, I use 
the ninetieth percentile of the income distribution in wave one following the conventional 
approach to building an affluence line in Latin American countries (e.g. Birdsall, 2007). 
Since the international poverty line makes a per-capita adjustment within the household's 
income, I follow the same equivalization procedure. 
 
Following the argument of Jarvis & Jenkins (1998), there are conceptual and empirical 
advantages that justify the use of absolute and relative cut-offs in parallel in order to 
identify groups in the income distribution. Conceptually, this strategy constitutes a 
midpoint between two different views. On the one hand, some advocate a fixed real 
income cut-off because poverty should decrease as real income goes up (Ferreira et al., 
2013). On the other hand, others prefer to study changes in income positions by defining 
thresholds that depend on the distribution of income itself (OECD, 2018a). From an 
empirical point of view, the use of absolute and relative thresholds allows for a sensitivity 
 
4 Differently from the procedure of income construction in industrialised countries, I did not extract taxes 
from disposable income, which is obtained through socioeconomic surveys because in the case of Chile 
the survey asks respondents for their net income. 




analysis of outcomes based on the differences between thresholds. For example, the cut-
off from the lower quintile is higher than the international poverty line used. 
 
The two dependent variables that I use in the empirical models developed in Section 5 
are income quintile groups (IQGs) and welfare level both in the current year. Regarding 
IQG variable, the relative cut-offs allow me to group the data in three categories: low 
income (IQG1), middle income (IQG2+ IQG3+ IQG4), high income (IQG5). Concerning 
the welfare level variable, the absolute thresholds identify: poor, middle class and rich. It 
is important to say that the middle-income group and the middle class are presented as 
a broad group in the income distribution. However, I do not make categorizations within 
these middle-groups because, as I have explained before, I focus on the positional 
change of the extremes of the income distribution. A similar argument is also valid to 
explain why I do not work with the continuous income distribution. Since my objective is 
to model the joint persistence of households in both high income and low income, as well 
as the poverty persistence and affluence persistence, I have to work with intrinsically 
discrete data. 
 
The explanatory variables included in the models are the income quintile groups and the 
welfare level in the previous year (the lagged dependent variable), and three sets of 
variables related to the composition of each household, the different assets that the 
household owns, and the household’s environment (location of the house). In the 
literature, these three vectors are described as the main determinants of the income 
mobility and poverty dynamics of a household (Galster, 2012; Jenkins, 2011).  
 
Household composition is summarised in terms of the household size, the number of 
children in the household, whether the household has a female head or not, and the age 
of the household head in the first wave. In order to estimate the effect of different types 
of family structures on the probability of moving in the distribution of income (Wiepking & 
Maas, 2005), I have also included a family typology that distinguishes between 
households with and without children, that have a single parent with children, and that 
comprise a lone person. 
 
Human capital, household labour market attachment and physical assets are used to 
measure household assets. Human capital is proxied by the education of the household 
head and the household head’s partner. Household labour market attachment is 
summarised by the employment status of the household head and the household head’s 
partner, and the number of workers in the household. When information on households’ 
financial or physical assets is not available, the house ownership information is used as 
a proxy for physical assets (Neilson, Contreras, Cooper, & Hermann, 2008). 
 




Regarding the location variables, I include the variable zone (urban or rural) and region. 
As will be explained in section 5, for the advanced modelling of Wooldridge’s model, I 
include additional time-invariant variables to solve both the unobserved heterogeneity and 
initial conditions problems.   
 
I do not include among explanatory variables those variables related to income shocks or 
trigger events, such as losing a job, having a separation or suffering from a disease 
(DiPrete & McManus, 2000). There are two reasons for not including this type of variable 
in regressions of positional income dynamics. The first reason is the difficulty of identifying 
the influence of the trigger-event variables on the transitions from one position to another 
in the income distribution if one also controls for characteristics measured at a particular 
point in time (Stevens, 1999).  
 
Second, variable trigger-events cannot be treated as exogenous variables. A change in 
the entry position and a trigger-event can be determined by a common factor that is not 
observable and the inclusion of the variable trigger-event could bias the estimated 
parameters. Biewen (2009) shows that this endogeneity situation can also occur for other 
point-in-time variables and, emphasises that caution should be exercised in regard to 
including explanatory variables in models that can generate biased estimates. See 
Jenkins (2011) for a detailed discussion of this.  
 
4. Persistence at the extremes of the income distribution in Chile: a 
description 
 
In this section I briefly describe the transitions of those in the two extremes of the income 
distribution in Chile during the analysed period for the balanced sample. Table 1 provides 
descriptive information of the variables for four subsamples. These subsamples are 
constructed using the persistence-at income-position indicator. This is defined as 
individuals living in households in a specific extreme income position in the current year 
and at least in two of the preceding three years.5  The first column of the table presents 
information for those who persist in the first income quintile group, while the second 
column corresponds to those who were in the fifth quintile in 2009 and were in that quintile 
at least twice between 2006 and 2008. The third and fourth columns present the 
persistence results for the poor and the affluent categories for the absolute thresholds. 
These represent the two extremes of the categories that measure income position in 
terms of welfare. The comparison between the columns in Table 1 allows for observing 
 
5 The statistics are based on the balanced sample weighted using the P-CASEN wave 4 enumerated 
individual weights. 




that certain variables are correlated with the extremes of the income position for both 
dependent variables.  
 
Regarding the relative cut-offs to identify the income position on both extremes of the 
income distribution, the results show that those who persisted in quintile group 1 show a 
higher proportion of women as head of household compared to those who remained in 
quintile group 5. Also, more than a third of those who remained in the highest income 
quintile group had a university education level compared to less than zero percent in the 
lowest quintile. Formal work and the number of workers per household show a 
significantly higher proportion in quintile group 5. The average number of couples with 
children is higher in quintile group 1. The same is true for the number of children per 
household. Income quintile group 1 also shows a higher proportion of households in rural 
areas whose housing is either subsidised or rent free. All in all, most of the differences 
between the averages of the variables mentioned above are accentuated when the 
comparison is made for absolute poverty persistence and affluence persistence. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables by subsample (persistence-at 
income-position) 
          
 Relative thresholds  Absolute thresholds 







 Mean Std. Dev. Mean 
Std. 





Household head characteristics          
   Female 0.361 (0.018) 0.315 (0.024)  0.332 (0.030) 0.370 (0.043) 
   Age 46.5 (0.617) 48.6 (0.726)  41.5 (0.685) 50.0 (1.536) 
   Education: Primary school 0.508 (0.021) 0.059 (0.010)  0.506 (0.036) 0.034 (0.012) 
   Education: Secondary school 0.425 (0.021) 0.416 (0.028)  0.400 (0.036) 0.327 (0.047) 
   Education: University degree 0.016 (0.006) 0.525 (0.029)  0.030 (0.015) 0.639 (0.048) 
   Labour status: Formal employed 0.496 (0.016) 0.839 (0.018)  0.496 (0.025) 0.786 (0.037) 
   Labour status: Informal employed 0.199 (0.011) 0.076 (0.011)  0.262 (0.022) 0.095 (0.022) 
   Labour status: Unemployed 0.050 (0.005) 0.005 (0.002)  0.065 (0.011) 0.003 (0.002) 
   Labour status: Inactive 0.254 (0.015) 0.080 (0.014)  0.177 (0.021) 0.116 (0.029) 
HH head’s partner characteristics          
   Age 39.3 (0.567) 47.4 (0.764)  37.5 (0.713) 47.7 (1.799) 
   Education: Primary school 0.562 (0.030) 0.065 (0.013)  0.624 (0.047) 0.038 (0.019) 
   Education: Secondary school 0.420 (0.030) 0.551 (0.035)  0.362 (0.047) 0.478 (0.076) 
   Education: University degree 0.000 (0.000) 0.380 (0.035)  0.000 (0.000) 0.484 (0.076) 
   Labour status: Formal employed 0.087 (0.011) 0.504 (0.030)  0.075 (0.017) 0.576 (0.067) 
   Labour status: Informal employed 0.078 (0.011) 0.060 (0.010)  0.073 (0.016) 0.021 (0.010) 
   Labour status: Unemployed 0.063 (0.010) 0.027 (0.007)  0.064 (0.015) 0.006 (0.004) 
   Labour status: Inactive 0.772 (0.018) 0.408 (0.030)  0.788 (0.027) 0.397 (0.067) 
Household characteristics          
   Equivalised total household income 96,334 (1,212) 828,46
1 
(35,081)  82,730 (2,164) 1,096,46
6 
(69,300) 
   Household type: Couple without 
children 
0.134 (0.012) 0.399 (0.026)  0.054 (0.014) 0.394 (0.048) 
   Household type: Single without 
children 
0.100 (0.011) 0.140 (0.022)  0.063 (0.015) 0.155 (0.032) 
   Household type: Couple with 
children 
0.458 (0.020) 0.322 (0.024)  0.622 (0.033) 0.186 (0.039) 




   Household type: Single with 
children 
0.192 (0.016) 0.060 (0.011)  0.241 (0.029) 0.040 (0.016) 
   Household type: Lone person 0.117 (0.013) 0.079 (0.017)  0.020 (0.010) 0.224 (0.041) 
   Number of persons 3.7 (0.070) 3.6 (0.088)  5.0 (0.137) 2.7 (0.125) 
   Number of children < 15  1.241 (0.051) 0.580 (0.043)  2.091 (0.099) 0.329 (0.062) 
   Number of workers 0.751 (0.020) 1.653 (0.045)  0.844 (0.036) 1.372 (0.072) 
   Housing: Own housing (no 
mortgage) 
0.449 (0.021) 0.448 (0.028)  0.406 (0.035) 0.413 (0.049) 
   Housing: Own housing, mortgage 0.041 (0.008) 0.262 (0.023)  0.031 (0.013) 0.246 (0.039) 
   Housing: Rent 0.141 (0.017) 0.228 (0.033)  0.133 (0.029) 0.271 (0.061) 
   Housing: Subsidized or rent free 0.369 (0.021) 0.062 (0.011)  0.430 (0.036) 0.070 (0.022) 
   Rural 0.239 (0.017) 0.036 (0.008)  0.261 (0.030) 0.026 (0.012) 
   Regions: 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th 0.095 (0.012) 0.104 (0.014)  0.092 (0.020) 0.069 (0.019) 
   Regions: 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 
10th 
0.648 (0.021) 0.362 (0.026)  0.614 (0.036) 0.316 (0.044) 
   Regions: 11th and 12th  0.006 (0.002) 0.019 (0.005)  0.008 (0.005) 0.017 (0.009) 
   Regions: 13th 0.251 (0.020) 0.515 (0.029)  0.285 (0.034) 0.598 (0.048) 
          
Source: Author’s calculations from the P-CASEN 2006-2009 (balanced sample with longitudinal weights 
are used). 
Notes: Maximum number of observations: 18,772 household-year observations. All results are rates (%) 
unless stated otherwise. The equivalised total household income is valued in terms of 2009 Chilean pesos. 
 
The descriptive analysis is complemented by showing the changes in the individuals in 
the two ends of the income distribution taking into account the central question of this 
investigation, which is: how does the position in the income distribution in the previous 
period affects the probability of being in the current position? I use transition matrices to 
analyse the state dependence. In Table 2 the rows indicate the previous position of the 
individual in the income distribution while the columns indicate the current position of the 
individual. For example, the elements of the first row provide information on the 
conditional distribution of the ranking of individuals in the income quintiles at time t since 
the individuals had been in the lowest quintile group. Transitions by quintiles are also 
shown for transitions between welfare measures.  
 
Table 2: Annual income position at t conditional on income position at t -1 
(A) Income quintile groups (IQGs): relative thresholds (B) Welfare level: absolute thresholds  
         
IQGs, year t -1 IQGs, year t (row %)  Welfare year t -1 Welfare, year t (row %) 
 IQG 1 IQGs 2-3-4 IQG 5   Poor Middle Class Affluent 
IQG 1 49.6 47.2 3.2  Poor 36.1 62.9 1.0 
IQGs 2-3-4 14.7 73.7 11.6  Middle class 7.4 88.2 4.4 
IQG 5 3.7 32.1 64.2  Affluent 1.8 37.3 60.8 
Total 19.2 59.6 21.3  Total 9.8 81.0 9.2 
         
Source: Author’s calculations from the P-CASEN 2006-2009 (balanced sample with longitudinal weights 
are used). 




In this way, the elements of Table 2 can be interpreted as the conditional probability under 
a Markov model. The persistence of the initial position in the distribution of income is 
observed, again, when considering the relative magnitudes of the elements of the 
diagonal and the elements close to it, in comparison to those that are far from the 
diagonal. When focusing on the two ends of the income distribution, I observe that staying 
in the highest quintile group (persistence at the top of the income distribution) has a 
probability of 0.64, while the probability of remaining in the lowest quintile group is 0.5 
(persistence at the bottom of the income distribution). In regard to welfare levels, 
persistence in the affluent category has a probability of 0.61, and persistence in poverty 
has a probability of 0.36. 
 
Regarding the issue of whether the sample retention is exogenous or endogenous to 
income position at t-1, Table A.2 (in the appendix) shows that the same calculations are 
made for both the balanced sample and the unbalanced sample, but without calculating 
the longitudinal weights. The proportion of missing income data is shown in the 
unbalanced sample. The results show the biggest problem is not the level of attrition of 
the sample but the proportion of missing income data, which is significantly different for 
income positions at t-1. As a result of this, provide evidence of attrition bias in the 
econometric strategy for modelling low-income/high-income persistence takes on real 
importance. In the next section, this point is explained in more detail. 
 
Figure 1: Probability of persistence in the bottom and top income quintile group 
in European countries during the period 2006-2009 
 

















































Probability of persistence at Quintile 1 (low-income)




Finally, to complement the descriptive analysis, I compare the indicators shown by the 
transition matrix of the income quintiles in Chile with other countries. To make this 
comparison, I use the Rendtel (2015) results, who uses the longitudinal component of the 
EU-SILC to compare income quintile groups transitions of European countries between 
2006-2009. Two precautions must be taken when making this comparison. First, Rendelt 
(2015) did not use the current scale suggested by the OECD to equivalise incomes of 
each country. Therefore, these results may vary slightly because I use the last scale 
suggested, which is the square root of household size. Second, I calculated an 
equivalised total household monthly income for Chile while Rendelt (2015) uses an 
annual income measure.6 Since changes in annual income are smoother than changes 
in monthly income, the comparison could be not adequate. However, despite these 
limitations, the information is useful as a reference of persistence in the bottom and top 
income quintile group in European countries during the same period analysed in Chile. 
 
Figure 1 shows the probability that individuals remain in the highest income quintile group 
during the period analysed together with the probability that individuals continue in the 
lowest quintile group. The persistence in low income is known as the sticky floor 
phenomenon due to the difficulty that households face to exit low income. In contrast, the 
glass floor image refers to the idea of high income people who observe others move along 
the income distribution without themselves falling from their current high-income position 
(OECD, 2018b). 
 
Overall, all countries show high mobility in terms of income position, though there are 
interesting specific differences when comparing them. Taking into account the 
precautions mentioned above to make the comparison, Chile could be included in the 
lower-left position in Figure 1 because it shows a lower recurrence of both high-income 
spells and low-income spells. Conversely, the European countries that show more 
evidence of the existence of a glass floor and a sticky floor (top-right position in Figure 1), 
are Finland (FIN), Holland (NLD), Sweden (SWE), Portugal (PRT), Norway (NOR) and 
Denmark (DNK). For this group of countries, the probability of persisting in the highest 
quintile group is 0.8 and the probability of persisting in the lowest quintile group is 0.6. 
during the period between 2006 and 2009. The Czech Republic (CZE), Poland (POL) and 
Bulgaria (BGR) show less persistence in the lowest quintile group but high persistence in 
the highest quintile group (top-left position in Figure 1). The rest of the countries are in 
the centre of the figure. 
 
 
6 The reason for not using annual equivalised income in my work is because the official measures of income 
inequality and poverty in Chile have a monthly period of reference. Therefore, the design of the P-CASEN 
2006-2009 focuses on obtaining a monthly income household making it challenging to build annual 
measures. For example, the first wave does not have the last year employment history of its interviewees. 




The results obtained from the descriptive analysis provide interesting elements for the 
discussion of individuals’ mobility within the income distribution in Chile. In the first place, 
there is the indisputable fact that in Chile, as in the rest of the OECD countries, a high 
persistence in terms of positions within the income distribution occurs at the two extremes 
of high- and low-income groups, both for the measure that uses relative cut-offs (income 
quintile groups) and the measure that uses absolute cuts (level of welfare).  
 
However, this is not particularly novel since all OECD countries follow a similar trend. 
What is new in the case of Chile is that the proportion of the population that persists at 
the extremes of the income distribution is significantly lower when compared with the 
group of Europeans OECD countries. Somehow, neither the sticky floor nor glass floor 
appear to be clearly displayed for the Chilean case. Comparing the results of Panel A in 
Table 2 with Figure 1, Chile shows not only the lowest probability of persistence in low 
incomes but also, and to a greater extent, in high incomes.  
 
These results are quite counterintuitive since, among all of the OECD countries, Chile 
has the weakest social protection system and the highest levels of inequality, where the 
redistribution mechanisms make little difference in the levels of inequality before and after 
they are implemented. Therefore, one would have expected to see that those in poverty 
would have less capacity to get out of that situation and that the more affluent ones would 
not easily move from their position, generating strategies to keep their privileges and 
advantages with respect to the rest of the society. As I mentioned earlier, the greater 
mobility at the extremes of the income distribution in Chile may be explained by the fact 
that I use the monthly disposable income for Chile, while Rendelt (2015) uses the annual 
disposable income. However, these results are consistent with other approaches on this 
topic in Chile.  
 
The high mobility at the bottom of the income distribution is probably related to Chile’s 
high income inequality. As it is well known, the inequality in Chile is mainly explained by 
the high concentration at the top (first income decile group) (Torche, 2005). Thus, for the 
case of the relative measure, the cut-offs between quintile groups 1 to 4 are not too far 
from each other (Chauvel, 2018). This means that changes in the positions in the income 
distribution do not necessarily represent significant changes in the individuals’ income. 
And, from the point of view of the absolute measures, the fact that poor individuals move 
up is what would explain the slight improvement in the levels of inequality in Chile.  
 
These results are in line with the qualitative work of Araujo & Marticcelli (2011) who found 
that there is a ‘positional inconsistency’ shared by households in all positions in the 
income distribution, particularly in high income position. The authors define ‘positional 
inconsistency’ as the existence of a feeling that all income and class positions are 




permeable to change in Chile, which entails living with permanent insecurity. In advanced 
societies, this feeling of anxiety or stress among individuals due to economic problems in 
the future is known as economic insecurity, which has been studied with greater intensity 
since the economic crisis of 2007–2008 (Hacker, 2018; Osberg, 2018; Rohde & Tang, 
2018). 
 
5. The econometric strategy 
 
Modelling joint low-income and high-income persistence 
Poverty and affluence persistence of individuals in the income distribution can be 
explained not only by the characteristics of the population but also by the previous 
poverty/affluence state that they had. One of the objectives of my research is to test the 
presence of poverty traps and affluence shields.7 That is, I study whether and to what 
extent the earlier welfare state affects the current probability of being poor and affluent. 
In other words, I test whether low-income persistence and high-income persistence are 
explained by the true or genuine state dependence (known as own-state traps/shields) 
and not by other observable and non-observable determinants.  
 
To model, simultaneously, the income persistence at the bottom and at the top of the 
income distribution I used random effect dynamic ordered probit (REDOP) models. Using 
REDOP models, it is possible to distinguish true state dependence captured by the impact 
of the lagged income position from spurious state dependence caused by the presence 
of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Thus, persistence may be partially due to 
individuals observed and unobserved heterogeneity rather than true state dependence. 
The general dynamic specification of the REDOP model is presented in Wooldridge(2005, 
p. 48). Applications of REDOP models to other outcomes such as health indicators and 
credit ratings are shown in Contoyannis, Jones and Rice (2004) and Mizen & Tsoukas 
(2009). 
 
As I pointed out in the previous section, I build the observed dependent variable in my 
model using both relative and absolute income cut-offs to identify low-income households 
and high-income households along the income distribution in each round. In the case of 
the two relative thresholds, the outcome has three categories: the lowest income quintile 
group, the highest income quintile group and the other groups. For the two absolute 
thresholds, the dependent variable also has three categories: poor, middle-class and 
affluent. By doing so, I can specify a dynamic model of the position of an individual 𝑖 in 
the income distribution at the interview date at time 𝑡 as follows: 
 
 
7 See discussion in section 2 of both poverty traps and affluence shields. 




𝑦!"∗ = 𝑓(𝑦!"$%, ℎ𝑐!" , ℎ𝑎!")           (1) 
 
where 𝑦!"∗  is a latent variable of the individual position in the income distribution as a 
function of lagged observed annual income position (𝑦!"$%), household composition (ℎ𝑐!"), 
and household assets (ℎ𝑎!"). 
 
I used REDOP models on both the balanced and unbalanced samples of the P-CASEN 
for the period 2006-2009. The REDOP considers categorical variables in which the order 
from the lowest to the highest is not indifferent. Therefore, the values for the lowest 
income quintile, the highest quintile group, and the other groups are 1, 3 and 2, 
respectively. For poor, middle-class and affluent, the values are 1, 2 and 3. Also, the 
REDOP allows for including among the regressors the position in the previous states in 
the model in order to capture the state dependence and the variables related to the 
individual that change (and do not change) over time. In this way, the model assumes 
that the positional persistence follows a first-order Markov model. In other words, 
positional persistence is identified by two consecutive years in the same position in the 
income distribution.  
 
The general dynamic model in equation (1) can be rewritten as a REDOP model: 
 
𝑦!"∗ = 𝛾′𝑦!"$% + 𝛽′𝑋!" + 𝜐!"           (2) 
 
𝑦!" = 𝑗					if						𝑘&$% < 𝑦!"∗ < 𝑘& 										𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚       (3) 
 
Here the subscript 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁	denotes the individuals, the subscript 𝑡 = 2,… , 𝑇! indicates 
the time period, 𝑇! is the number of time periods observed for the 𝑖th	individual.8 𝑋!" are 
the observed explanatory variables, and 𝑦!"$% is an indicator of the position of the 
individual in the distribution of income in the previous year. 𝛾 is the state dependence 
parameter to be estimated and 𝜐!" is the unobservable error term. 
 
In equation (3), an individual is observed to be in one of the 𝑚 position categories in the 
income distribution when the latent variable of the income position (𝑦!"∗ ) is between 
𝑘&$%	and 𝑘&. The threshold values 𝑘	correspond to the cut-offs where an individual could 
move from one position category in the income distribution to another. This is because, 
even though the latent outcome, 𝑦!"∗ , is not observed, it is known in which category the 
latent variable falls (𝑦!"). These models include in their estimations the cut-offs that 
separate one category from another. 
 
 
8 I estimated the dynamic models using data from waves 2-4 due to the use of lagged dependent variables. 




Heckman and Borjas (1980) noted that equation (2), by not considering unobserved 
heterogeneity in the model, has the potential problem of biasing the estimates of the 
lagged variable, which might have a significant effect on the probability of the dependent 
variable. These authors propose that equation (2) should control for all observable and 
unobservable characteristics of individuals. In this way, the unobservable error term (𝜐!") 
could be decomposed into two terms (𝜐!" = 𝜇! + 𝜀!"), where 𝜇! is a time-invariant individual 
specific effect, and 𝜀!" is the remaining disturbance, which is assumed to follow a standard 
normal distribution with a zero mean and unit variance. Therefore, if I assume that 𝜀!" is 
not related to the independent variables, equation (2) can be modified in the following 
way: 
 
𝑦!"∗ = 𝛾′𝑦!"$% + 𝛽′𝑋!" + 𝜇! + 𝜀!"          (4) 
 
Like the binary probit model, explanatory variables are introduced into the model by 
making the latent variable 𝑦!"∗  a linear function of the 𝑋!", and adding a normally distributed 
error term. This means that the probability of an individual reporting a particular value of 
𝑦!" = 𝑗	is given by the difference between the probability of the respondent having a value 
of 𝑦!"∗  less than 𝑘& and the probability of having a value of 𝑦!"∗   less than 𝑘&$%. The probability 
that the observation 𝑖 will select income position 𝑗 at time 𝑡 (𝑦!") conditioned to the 
independent variables and the individual effect can be expressed as follows: 
 
𝑃!"& = 𝑃(𝑦!" = 𝑗) = Φ(𝑘& − 𝛾′𝑦!"$% − 𝛽′𝑋!" − 𝜇!) − Φ(𝑘&$% − 𝛾′𝑦!"$% − 𝛽′𝑋!" − 𝜇!) (5) 
 
Where Φ(. ) is the standard normal distribution function, which assumes that its density is 
𝑁(0, 𝜎'() and where 𝑗) is taken as −	∞ and 𝑗* is taken as +	∞. Using these probabilities, 
it is possible to use maximum probability estimation to estimate the parameters of the 
model. These include the 𝛽𝑠 (the coefficients on the 𝑋 variables) and the unknown cut-
off values (the 𝑘𝑠). 
 










!/%      (6) 
 
The integral included in expression (6) can be approximated with M-point Gauss-Hermite 
quadrature. I use the mean-variance adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature to approximate 
the log likelihood. The REDOP models are estimated using the meoprobit command in 
Stata (Release 15.0, Stata Corporation). This command calculates the standard deviation 
for each parameter clustered at the house level in wave 1. 
 




The initial conditions and correlated random effects problems in short-period 
panel data 
When estimating the degree of state dependence of a condition (poverty or affluence) it 
is crucial to distinguish between true state dependence due to genuine causal effects of 
the past on current outcomes, and spurious state dependence, caused by the presence 
of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. This implies dealing with the initial conditions 
and unobserved heterogeneity.  
 
The initial conditions problem appears when the observed start of the Markov model (𝑦!%) 
does not necessarily coincide with the true start of the process (Heckman, 1981). Given 
that I am estimating dynamic models I need to take into account whether the panel data 
shows a correlation between the initial position of the individuals in the income distribution 
(𝑦!%) and the individuals’ unobserved heterogeneity. If the initial condition is not 
exogenous the estimate of the parameter of interest 𝛾 is biased upwards because part of 
the effect of the unobserved heterogeneity is captured by the coefficient on the lag 
dependent variable (Stewart, 2007). 
 
I follow Wooldridge (2005) solution to solve the initial conditions problem.9 Wooldridge’s 
method allows individual effects to be correlated with explanatory variables, which partly 
controls for the endogeneity between the explanatory variables and the outcome. To do 
that, I model 𝑦!" at period 𝑡 = 2,… , 𝑇	conditional on the initial value of the dependent 
variable (𝑦!%) and exogenous variables (𝑋!"). Then specify an approximation for the 
density of 𝜇! conditional on the initial value of the dependent variable (𝑦!%) and the period-
specific versions of the time-varying explanatory variables starting from the second period 
of observations (𝑋!0)  as: 
 
𝜇! = 𝜇) + 𝜇%′𝑦!% + 𝜇(′𝑋!0 + 𝑒!          (7) 
 
Where 𝑋!0 = (𝑥!(4 , … , 𝑥!.4 )  and 𝑒! 	is a normal distribution that assumes 𝑁(0, 𝜎5(). 
 
The second problem is the correlated random effects of dynamic panel model.  Like the 
standard uncorrelated random effects probit models, so far, equation (4) is assuming that 
𝜇!  is uncorrelated with 𝑋!". If this assumption is not met, then the maximum likelihood 
estimates are inconsistent. In order to deal with this issue, I could relax the assumption 
 
9 In Heckman’s solution, the initial conditions problem is solved by approximating the density function of the 
initial period using the same parametric form as conditional density for the rest of observations 
(Arulampalam & Stewart, 2009). Although the codes of its implementation are available, the computational 
implementation is hard because it requires separate programming owing to the absence of standard 
package. An alternative based on Heckman’s proposal is the method of Orme (2001). The problem with 
Orme’s solution is that it assumes a low correlation between the initial position of the individuals in the 
income distribution and individuals’ unobserved effect, which is a strong assumption when using data from 
a short panel. 




adding within-means of the explanatory variables into the main equation (Chamberlain, 
1984; Mundlak, 1978). This allows for correlating the unobserved heterogeneity and the 
means of the observed independent variables. Following Wooldridge’s approach, I could 
replace 𝑋!0 with the means of the time-varying explanatory variables of all time periods 
(Stewart, 2007). 
 
However, this solution can present significant biases in longitudinal data with less than 
four rounds and a sample size of less than 800 cases per round (Akay, 2012; 
Arulampalam & Stewart, 2009). Even though the P-CASEN does not fit this description, 
since it has 4 rounds and a sample size exceeding the minimum recommended, in order 
to be on the safe side, I follow Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal’s (2013) proposal to deal with 
a short panel using the Wooldridge approach for correlated random effects. To do that, I 
replace 𝑋!0 in equation (7) by the mean 𝑋60aaaa = (1 𝑇 − 1)∑ 𝑥!"."/(⁄  that does not include the 
initial period explanatory variables. 
 
Therefore, by parameterizing the unobserved heterogeneity distribution in this way, I 
address for short panels both the initial conditions problem and the correlated random 
effects problem. This assumes both the normality of 𝜇! and a zero-correlation between: i) 
the covariates, ii) the initial conditions and iii) the idiosyncratic error term (𝜀!").10 Thus, 
equation (4) is rewritten as follows: 
 
𝑦!"∗ = 𝛾′𝑦!"$% + 𝛽′𝑋!" + 𝜇) + 𝜇%′𝑦!% + 𝜇(′𝑋60aaaa + 𝑒! + 𝜀!"      (8) 
 
Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2013)demonstrate that equation (8) will perform well as 
Heckman estimators for short-period of panel data. The parameters of equation (8) can 
be estimated following the process described in equations (5) and (6). The results from 
the implementation of this econometric strategy are presented in the next section. 
 
6. Estimation results 
 
Estimates of dynamic ordered probit models based on random effects 
specifications 
The dynamic ordered probit models with Wooldridge’s specification of correlated effects 
and initial conditions (Eq. 8) was estimated for the balanced sample. These models were 
estimated by maximum likelihood using Gauss-Hermite quadrature with 12 evaluation 
points. The balanced sample models use longitudinal survey weights. The results of the 
 
10 These two strong assumptions require a certain amount of caution at the moment of interpreting the 
results of the REDOP models.  




REDOP models are reported in Tables 3. In model 1, the low-income position and high-
income position refer to the lowest income quintile group (IQG 1) and the highest income 
quintile group (IQG 5), respectively. Both groups are defined using relative thresholds. 
For model 2, the ends of the income distribution are defined as poor and affluent using 
absolute cut-offs. 
 
The models were estimated for the household level to which the data on the 
characteristics of the head of household, head of household’ partner, and characteristics 
of the household was assigned. The equation covers the years 2007-2009, while the initial 
conditions of the equation refer to the year 2006. Among the independent variables of the 
model is the lagged dependent variable, which captures the dynamic component of 
income position. In estimating the model, the head of the household used as the reference 
point is assumed to be a man, who completed secondary school, has a formal job, owns 
his house, has a couple without children and lives in an urban area in the capital city in 
Chile (region 13th). 
 
Impact of explanatory variables 
The parameters obtained after controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity and 
initial conditions in the REDOP models are contained in Table 3. Before discussing the 
main parameters of interest, 𝛾′, which measures the extent of low-income persistence 
and high-income persistence, I briefly consider the estimates of the other parameters in 
both models, those relating to the explanatory variables. 
 
Table 3: Random effect dynamic ordered probit models 
         
Variables (1) Income quintile groups (IQGs) (2) Welfare level  
 (Relative thresholds)  (Absolute thresholds)  
 Coefficient Std. Dev.  Coefficient Std. Dev.  
Lagged dependent variable for models (1) and (2)        
  Ref. (1) IQGs 2-3-4 / (2) Middle class at t-1         
         (1) IQG 1 (lowest) / (2) Poor at t-1 -0.254 *** (0.052)  -0.174 ** (0.082)  
         (1) IQG 5 (highest) / (2) Affluent at t-1 0.358 *** (0.069)  0.803 *** (0.131)  
Initial conditions for models (1) and (2)        
  Ref. (1) IQGs 2-3-4 / (2) Middle class at t1        
         (1) IQG 1 (lowest) / (2) Poor at t1 -0.555 *** (0.059)  -0.497 *** (0.096)  
         (1) IQG 5 (highest) / (2) Affluent at t1 1.149 *** (0.088)  1.099 *** (0.179)  
Household head characteristics         
   Female -0.101 ** (0.047)  -0.037  (0.065)  
   Age 0.004 *** (0.002)  0.008 *** (0.002)  
   Ref. Education: Secondary school         
      Education: Primary school -0.248 *** (0.037)  -0.229 *** (0.042)  
      Education: University degree 0.719 *** (0.095)  0.635 *** (0.124)  
   Ref. Labour status: Formal employed         
      Labour status: Informal employed -0.116 * (0.064)  -0.132  (0.097)  
      Labour status: Unemployed -0.883 *** (0.188)  -0.902 *** (0.174)  
      Labour status: Inactive -0.424 *** (0.114)  -0.632 *** (0.151)  
HH head's partner characteristics         




   Age 0.002  (0.003)  -0.005  (0.003)  
   Ref. Education: Secondary school         
      Education: Primary school -0.295 *** (0.046)  -0.214 *** (0.057)  
      Education: University degree 0.328 *** (0.118)  0.350 *** (0.128)  
   Ref. Labour status: Formal employed         
      Labour status: Informal employed -0.091  (0.092)  -0.045  (0.114)  
      Labour status: Unemployed -0.168  (0.135)  0.069  (0.151)  
      Labour status: Inactive -0.015  (0.068)  0.003  (0.096)  
Household characteristics         
   Ref. Household type: Couple without children        
      Household type: Single without children 0.049  (0.144)  0.339 ** (0.169)  
      Household type: Couple with children 0.113  (0.103)  0.076  (0.124)  
      Household type: Single with children 0.068  (0.174)  -0.110  (0.207)  
      Household type: Lone person -0.287  (0.205)  0.724 ** (0.235)  
   Number of persons 0.245 *** (0.028)  -0.338 *** (0.036)  
   Number of children < 15  -0.071  (0.058)  0.021  (0.071)  
   Number of workers 0.862 *** (0.034)  0.790 *** (0.049)  
   Ref. Housing: Own housing (no mortgage)        
      Housing: Own housing, mortgage 0.126 ** (0.054)  0.169 *** (0.066)  
      Housing: Rent -0.140 ** (0.067)  -0.147 * (0.080)  
      Housing: Subsidized or rent free -0.194 *** (0.050)  -0.347 *** (0.060)  
   Rural -0.183 *** (0.045)  -0.165 *** (0.055)  
   Ref. Regions: 13th         
      Regions: 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th 0.069  (0.055)  -0.011  (0.065)  
      Regions: 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th -0.168 *** (0.041)  -0.218 *** (0.053)  
      Regions: 11th and 12th  0.108  (0.096)  0.071  (0.112)  
Statistics         
   Cut 1 -1.189  (0.144)  -2.565  (0.228)  
   Cut 2 1.917  (0.145)  1.921  (0.195)  
   Variance unobservable heterogeneity 0.435  (0.061)  0.333  (0.096)  
Log pseudolikelihood -7,703,729.3  -4,745,448.4  
Number of household-years 13,920  13,920  
Number of households 4,640  4,640  
         
Source: Author’s calculations from the P-CASEN 2006-2009 (balanced sample with longitudinal weights 
are used). 
Notes:  Coefficients for year dummies and within means of demographics not reports for brevity. Models 
estimated using observation for t > 1. *** significance at 10 percent; ** significance at 5 percent; * 
significance at 1 percent. 
 
Table 3 shows the coefficient of the explanatory variables on the probability of being low-
income and high-income. Regarding the demographic characteristics of the head of 
household, age has a positive impact on the probability of being in the highest IQG and 
being affluent. While, a female head of household has a significant effect on the 
probability of being in the lowest IQG, and not on the probability of being poor. 
 
As suggested by the human capital theory, household members who have a larger 
endowment of formal education increase the probability of their households being high 
income. Although having completed university-level education for the head household 
and head household's partner are statistically significant, the coefficients for the head 
household is double than his/her partner in both models. 
 




The head household labour status is also important to explain whether the household is 
located at the extremes of the income distribution. As expected, being unemployed is the 
highest coefficient among the observable variables explaining the increase in the 
probability of being in the lowest quintile or being poor. However, for the household head’s 
partner, it is not significant in either of the two models. The variable that does has the 
most significant positive effect on the probability of being in the highest IQG and being 
affluent is the number of workers. 
 
Household size is a variable sensitive to the income thresholds used to define low-income 
and high-income in the income distribution. While in Model 1, this variable increases the 
probability of being in the highest IQG in model 2, the impact is also significant but 
increases the probability of being poor. 
 
As to housing, those who do not own the house have a higher probability of low-income 
in both models. Regarding location, households that are both in rural areas and in 
intermediate regions (not including the metropolitan 13th Region) have a greater 
probability of being in the lowest quintile or being poor. 
 
Finally, both models 1 and 2 introduce explicit unobserved individual heterogeneity into 
the dynamic ordered probit model by specifying random effects (last row of Table 3). The 
latent error variance attributable to unobserved heterogeneity is 43.5 per cent for the 
Model 1 and 33 per cent for the level of Model 2. This measure corresponds to the intra-
class correlation coefficient (ICC). 
 
Initial conditions and state dependence in both low-income and high income 
As I explained above, the critical estimation problem of state dependence is the potential 
endogeneity of the initial conditions. Table 3 shows in rows (3) and (4) the parameter 
estimates for the initial condition variables are highly significant for both models (at 1 per 
cent or lower). The effect that is controlling for initial conditions has on the estimates of 
the magnitude of low-income persistence and high-income persistence I will be discussed 
below in Table 4. 
 
The 𝛾′ coefficients are presented in the first two rows of Table 3. These values correspond 
to the true state dependence for both low-income and high-income positions. It is clear 
that after controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity, being low-income in 
period 𝑡 − 1 has a negative and statistically significant effect on the probability to move 
into a higher income position in period 𝑡 while being in high-income in period t-1 has a 
positive and statistically significant effect on the probability to stay in the same income 
position.  There is, therefore, a genuine state dependence in the ends of the income 
distribution. However, the magnitude of the coefficients varies between both models. The 




affluence persistence coefficient is more than double that of the IQG5 persistence, while 
the poverty persistence coefficient is lower than the IQG1 persistence. 
 
Table 4: Alternative estimators of lagged dependent variable for IQG 1/poor and 
IQG 5/affluent 
    
Lagged dependent variable (1) Pooled 
ordered probit  
(2) Random effect 
dynamic ordered 
probit 





Income quintile groups (IQGs)    
   IQG 1 (lowest) at t-1 -0.647 -0.522 -0.254 
   IQG 5 (highest) at t-1 1.102 0.971 0.358 
Welfare level    
   Poor at t-1 -0.572 -0.521 -0.174 
   Affluent at t-1 1.516 1.469 0.803 
    
Source: Author’s calculations from the P-CASEN 2006-2009 (balanced sample with longitudinal weights 
are used). 
Notes:  All coefficients for pooled ordered probit model (1) and REDOP without specifications (2) are 
significant at 1 per cent. Models estimated using observation for t > 1. 
 
Table 4 provides further information on the extent of state dependence for low-income 
and high-income. The γ' coefficients from the first and second rows of Table 3 are 
reproduced in the third column while the first and second columns contain other measures 
of state dependence. There are coefficients on a lagged dependent variable for IQG 
1/poor and IQG 5/affluent in a pooled ordered probit model and a dynamic ordered probit 
model assuming exogenous initial conditions (Eq. 4). In other words, Table 4 shows how 
I control models for observed and unobserved heterogeneity (column (2)) and 
heterogeneity and initial conditions (column (3)). 
 
When I move the columns from left to right in Table 4, it is clear that the estimated extent 
of low-income and high-income decline as I control for more factors. In the model (1), 
between columns (1) and (3), the reduction of the coefficients for both IGQ 1 persistence 
and IQG 5 persistence is more than 60 per cent. In the model (3), the extent of poverty 
persistence coefficient estimated using REDOP with specifications of correlated effects 
and initial conditions is 70 per cent lower than from the pooled data. In the case of 
affluence persistence, it leads to a reduction of 47 per cent of the initial estimate. 
Therefore, controlling for heterogeneity and initial conditions is crucial when trying to 
establish the level of true state dependence in both low-income and high-income. 
 




Average partial effect of the state dependence 
 
The coefficients provided by the REDOP models for the previous income position (𝑡 − 1) 
are arbitrary. For this reason, they do not allow us to identify the magnitude of the state 
dependence on the conditional probability of staying in low-income/high-income. In order 
to have an indicator of the weight of the state dependence in absolute terms, it is 
necessary to calculate the average partial effects (APEs). The APE for the state 
dependence shows the impact of the previous income position (𝑡 − 1) in the current 
income position (𝑡). The state dependence effect is calculated as the difference between 
the average probability of being in a certain income position at time 𝑡 after being in the 
same income position at time 𝑡 − 1 over the sample of those who were in other entry 
positions at 𝑡 − 1 and the raw aggregate probability of being in that particular entry 
position at time 𝑡 over the same sample (Wooldridge, 2005). 
 
I compute APEs for each of the categories for both ends of the income quintile groups 
and welfare level measurements. The estimates in Table 5a and Table 5b indicate that 
the contribution of genuine state dependence in the estimated models is less than 10 per 
cent. When comparing the extremes of the income distribution for both measures, I found 
that 4.3 per cent of those in the lowest quintile group (IQG 1) and 5.4 per cent of those in 
the highest income quintile group (IQG 5) are explained by having been in the same 
income position at 𝑡 − 1, thereby holding fixed characteristics. For the welfare measure, 
the state dependence effect is 5.8 per cent for the poor and 9.2 per cent for the rich. 
 
To put these results in context, it would be useful to compare them with those from other 
studies but, as I previously noted, there are no other studies of high-income persistence. 
Regarding research on low-income persistence, they use different definitions of low-
income and different methodologies, and this should be taken into account when 
comparing with other countries. Giarda & Moroni (2018) exploits the longitudinal 
component of EU-SILC for the period 2009–2012 to estimate poverty persistence in four 
European countries using dynamic random effects probit models after controlling for 
individual heterogeneity and initial conditions. Their estimates show that Italy has the 
highest poverty persistence, with an APE of 0.159 compared to 0.110 in France, 0.126 in 
Spain and 0.045 in the UK. In the case that I had applied the poverty line used by Giarda 
& Moroni (2018) to the P-CASEN 2006-2009, its value would be close to the relative cut-
off to identify the lowest income quintile group.11 Therefore, it could be the case that being 
poor at time 𝑡 − 1 in Chile has a lower impact on the probability of being poor at time 𝑡 
than in the four countries compared. 
 
11 The poverty line used by these authors is fixed at the 60 percent of the national median equivalised 
disposable income.  





Table 5a: Average partial effects on probability of being on low-income  
 
Variables Low-income 
 (1) IQG 1 (lowest)  (2) Poor 
 dy/dx  Std. Dev.  dy/dx  Std. Dev. 
Lagged dependent variable for models (1) and (2)       
   Ref. (1) IQGs 2-3-4 / (2) Middle class at t-1        
      (1) IQG 1 (lowest) / (2) Poor at t-1 0.043 *** (0.010)  0.019 * (0.010) 
Household head characteristics        
   Female 0.016 ** (0.008)  0.004  (0.007) 
   Age -0.001 ** (0.000)  -0.001 *** (0.000) 
   Ref. Education: Secondary school        
      Education: Primary school 0.040 *** (0.006)  0.024 *** (0.004) 
      Education: University degree -0.095 *** (0.010)  -0.051 *** (0.007) 
   Ref. Labour status: Formal employed        
      Labour status: Informal employed 0.019 * (0.010)  0.014  (0.010) 
      Labour status: Unemployed 0.165 *** (0.039)  0.128 *** (0.031) 
      Labour status: Inactive 0.071 *** (0.021)  0.076 *** (0.023) 
HH head's partner characteristics        
   Ref. Education: Secondary school        
      Education: Primary school 0.048 *** (0.008)  0.023 *** (0.006) 
      Education: University degree -0.048 *** (0.016)  -0.031 *** (0.010) 
Household characteristics        
   Number of persons -0.038 *** (0.004)  0.034 *** (0.003) 
   Number of workers -0.136 *** (0.005)  -0.080 *** (0.004) 
   Ref. Housing: Own housing (no mortgage)        
      Housing: Own housing, mortgage -0.019 ** (0.008)  -0.016 *** (0.006) 
      Housing: Rent 0.023 ** (0.011)  0.015 * (0.009) 
      Housing: Subsidized or rent free 0.032 *** (0.008)  0.038 *** (0.007) 
   Rural 0.030 *** (0.008)  0.017 *** (0.006) 
   Ref. Regions: 13th        
      Regions: 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th -0.011  (0.008)  0.001  (0.007) 
      Regions: 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th 0.027 *** (0.006)  0.022 *** (0.005) 















Table 5b: Average partial effects on probability of being on high-income  
         
Variables  High income 
  (1) IQG 5 (highest)  (2) Affluent 
  dy/dx  Std. Dev.  dy/dx  Std. Dev. 
Lagged dependent variable for models (1) and (2)  
   Ref. (1) IQGs 2-3-4 / (2) Middle class at t-1         
      (1) IQG 5 (highest) / (2) Affluence at t-1  0.058 *** (0.013)  0.092 *** (0.022) 
Household head characteristics         
   Female  -0.014 ** (0.007)  -0.003  (0.005) 
   Age  0.001 ** (0.000)  0.001 *** (0.000) 
   Ref. Education: Secondary school         
      Education: Primary school  -0.035 *** (0.005)  -0.018 *** (0.003) 
      Education: University degree  0.122 *** (0.017)  0.065 *** (0.014) 
   Ref. Labour status: Formal employed         
      Labour status: Informal employed  -0.016 * (0.009)  -0.010  (0.007) 
      Labour status: Unemployed  -0.104 *** (0.017)  -0.053 *** (0.007) 
      Labour status: Inactive  -0.058 *** (0.015)  -0.045 *** (0.011) 
HH head's partner characteristics         
   Ref. Education: Secondary school         
      Education: Primary school  -0.041 *** (0.006)  -0.017 *** (0.004) 
      Education: University degree  0.051 *** (0.020)  0.033 ** (0.014) 
Household characteristics         
   Number of persons  0.035 *** (0.004)  -0.028 *** (0.003) 
   Number of workers  0.124 *** (0.004)  0.066 *** (0.003) 
   Ref. Housing: Own housing (no mortgage)         
      Housing: Own housing, mortgage  0.019  (0.008)  0.015 ** (0.006) 
      Housing: Rent  -0.020  (0.009)  -0.012 * (0.006) 
      Housing: Subsidized or rent free  -0.027 *** (0.007)  -0.026 *** (0.004) 
   Rural  -0.026 *** (0.006)  -0.013 *** (0.004) 
   Ref. Regions: 13th         
      Regions: 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th  0.010  (0.008)  -0.001  (0.005) 
      Regions: 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th  -0.024 *** (0.006)  -0.018 *** (0.004) 
      Regions: 11th and 12th   0.016  (0.015)  0.006  (0.010) 
         
Source: Author’s calculations from the P-CASEN 2006-2009. 
Notes:  Models estimated using observation for t > 1. *** significance at 10 percent; ** significance at 5 
percent; * significance at 1 percent. 
 
Testing the attrition bias 
 
I analyse the extent to which the results are robust to the possibility of selection bias due 
to no-random attrition from the household panel sample. The main problem associated 
with non-random attrition in the sample is when the variables affecting attrition might be 
correlated with the outcome variable of interest. In this situation, econometric estimates 




of key relationships will be biased.12 In other words, attrition bias could occur if the error 
term in the equation of interest is correlated with the error term in the attrition equation 
(Wooldridge, 2002b). 
 
To get an idea of the potential importance of non-random sample drop out in P-CASEN 
2006-2009, Table A.1 (see appendix) reports the descriptive statistics for both balanced 
sample and unbalanced sample. The unbalanced sample contains all of the observations 
available in each round. The balanced sample uses all of the relevant variables that have 
information in the four rounds. When comparing the two samples, which do not use 
weights in the estimation of the means of the observable characteristics, it is possible to 
identify the impact of attrition. Results in Table A.1 suggest there is a relation between 
low-income/high-income and non-response. For example, small households, with less 
children and a higher level of schooling of its head −which on average are richer−, tended 
to be lost. The same is observed in households with better labour conditions and, 
accordingly, with higher incomes. Therefore, low-income households seem to be 
overrepresented and high-income ones underrepresented in the panel.13 
 
As I said before, the problem arising from non-random selection is that it might lead to 
biased estimators. Therefore, the next step is to identify whether the non-randomness of 
the attrition bias the REDOP models. Testing whether or not there is attrition bias is not 
straightforward because the variables related to attriters are not observable in the year in 
which households stop participating in the panel sample. However, information is 
available on the observable variables of previous years for households that leave the 
panel. Verbeek and Nijman (1992) propose including in the main equation of the model 
indicators describing individuals’ pattern of survey response (known as variable-addition 
tests). The intuition behind the test is that if the attrition is not random, the indicators of 
an individual’s pattern of survey responses should be associated with the dependent 
variables of the model after controlling for the independent variables. The test variables 
that I use are: a) an indicator summarising whether attrition occurred in the following wave 
(Next wave); b) the total number of waves in which the individual is observed (N waves); 
and c) an indicator of whether the individual is in the survey all the time (All waves). Each 
of these indicators is added to the dynamic correlated effects ordered probit model, given 
by equations (8) and estimated with the unbalanced sample. This gives three separate 
attrition bias tests. If the coefficients of the variables related to the test are zero (𝐻): 𝛽 =
0), then there will be no selection bias explained by the attrition. 
 
 
12 This is closely related to the general case that Heckman (1979) called sample selection bias, arising in 
situations where a sample is not drawn randomly from the population of interest. 
13 Nevertheless, when comparing the means of the variables after using longitudinal weights in the balanced 
sample, they appear similar to the means of the unbalanced sample. I will return to this point later. 




Table 6: Variable-addition tests for attrition bias as proposed by Verbeek and 
Nijmand (1992) 
 
         
Attrition indicators REDOP with specifications of 
correlated effects and initial conditions 
 (1) Income quintile groups  (2) Welfare level  
 Coefficient  Std. Dev.  Coefficient  Std. Dev.  
Next wave 0.194 ** (0.091)  0.123  (0.114)  
N waves 0.036  (0.119)  -0.021  (0.141)  
All waves -0.197  (0.091)  -0.008  (0.124)  
         
Source: Author’s calculations from the P-CASEN 2006-2009 (unbalanced sample). 
Notes: Models estimated using observation for t > 1. ** significance at 5 percent; * significance at 1 percent. 
 
Table 6 shows the estimated coefficients on the additional variables using the dynamic 
ordered probit models for random effects specifications. I applied the tests for the two 
dependent variables: income quintile groups (1) and welfare measurement (2). In only 
one case of the model (1) the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 per cent level. In other 
cases, the variable-addition tests are insignificant, and the evidence suggests that bias 
due to non-random attrition may not be a major problem. It is worth noticing that adding 
attrition indicators on the models is not intended to correct the estimates for attrition. 
Similar to other studies that have used variable-addition tests in their analyses, these are 
only informative for comparing estimates with the baseline models that do not include the 
test variable (Clark & Kanellopoulos, 2013; Contoyannis et al., 2004). Other limitations of 
these tests is that they may have low power, and also do not test selection on 
unobservable (correlation between the error terms), but only selection on observable 
(Nicoletti, 2006). 
 
I provide additional evidence about whether selectivity bias is a problem by focusing on 
the difference between estimates from models that use weights to adjust for attrition and 
estimates from models without weights. To do the latter, I adopt an inverse probability 
weight (IPW) estimator for the unbalanced sample, and I use the longitudinal weights 
provided by the Chilean Ministry of Social Development for the balanced sample, which 
also adjusts for non-response over the period studied.  I apply both of them to 
Wooldridge’s pooled ordered probit model (2002b, 2002a).14  
 
 
14 The estimator cannot be applied to the log-likelihood function for the random effects specification because 
it is restricted only to objective functions that are additive across observations (Contoyannis, Jones, & Rice, 
2004). 




The idea behind the IPW estimator is the following: the weight adjustment associated with 
each observation is inversely proportional to the propensity to respond in each wave 
(𝑟!" 	= 	1 if observed; 0 otherwise) given a set of individual characteristics in the first wave 
(𝑧!%). An estimate of the response probability (?̂?!"7 ) is derived from a statistical model (e.g., 
a probit regression). Therefore, individuals having characteristics such as a high ?̂?!"7  will 
have an adjustment factor close to 1, while individuals with characteristics associated with 
non-response (low ?̂?!"7 ) will have a higher factor. This approach requires 𝑧!% to include the 
initial values of all of the regressors, as well as the initial income position states. Further, 
variables that predict attrition and are correlated with the outcome of interest, are 
deliberately excluded from Eq. (8).  
 
I use as instrumental variables two dichotomous indicators related to the household’s 
dwelling (whether the households resided on in a flat, whether the rent is more than 25 
percent of the total household income) and a health indicator of the head household 
(whether during the last year he/she has received some outpatient or hospital care for 
chronic disease).  
 
I estimate a probit model for response/non-response at each wave, from wave 2 to wave 
4, using the full sample of households who are observed at wave 1. The inverse of the 
fitted probabilities from these models, 1/?̂?!"7 , are then used to weight observations in the 
maximum likelihood estimation of the pooled ordered probit model in the objective 
function as follow: 
 
ln 𝐿 = ∑ ∑ (𝑟!"/?̂?!"7 ) ln 𝐿!".!/"3!/% ,			𝑡 = 2,… , 𝑇        (9) 
 
IPW works to identify attrition problem for a simple reason. Under the ignorability non-
response assumption, the conditional on observables in the first time period (𝑧!%) is 
independent of 𝑟!": 
 
𝑃(𝑟!" = 1|𝑦!" , 𝑦!"$%, 𝑋!",	𝑧!%) = 𝑃(𝑟!" = 1|	𝑧!%),							𝑡 = 2,… , 𝑇     (10) 
 
Wooldridge (2002b) prove that the IPW produces a consistent √𝑁- asymptotically normal 
estimator. Therefore, “the probability limit of the weighted objective function is identical to 
that of the unweighted function if we had no attrition problem” Wooldridge (2002a, p. 588). 
This IPW estimator is implemented for the unbalanced sample using the pweights option 
in Stata (Release 15.0, Stata Corporation). Also, longitudinal weights are used for the 
balance sample. The estimates from both weighted models are compared with the 
estimates from the unweighted models for both balanced and unbalanced samples to 
assess the attrition bias.  
 




Table 7: Weighted and unweighted estimates from pooled dynamic ordered probit 
models  
            
Lagged dependent and initial 
conditions variables for 
models (1) and (2) 
Unbalanced panel  Balanced panel 
Unweighted IPW  Unweighted Longitudinal weights 
Coeff. Std. Dev.  Coeff. 
Std. 
Dev.  Coeff. 
Std. 
Dev.  Coeff. 
Std. 
Dev. 
(1) Income quintile groups             
   Lagged dependent variable            
      IQG 1 (lowest) t-1 -0.576 (0.033)  -0.592 (0.039)  -0.575 (0.035)  -0.577 (0.036) 
      IQG 5 (highest) t-1 0.708 (0.045)  0.723 (0.059)  0.744 (0.048)  0.757 (0.054) 
   Initial conditions variable            
      IQG 1 (lowest) t1 -0.313 (0.033)  -0.331 (0.040)  -0.310 (0.034)  -0.301 (0.040) 
      IQG 5 (highest) t1 0.618 (0.047)  0.671 (0.059)  0.655 (0.050)  0.690 (0.054) 
(2) Welfare level            
   Lagged dependent variable            
      Poor t-1 -0.463 (0.047)  -0.500 (0.057)  -0.487 (0.050)  -0.479 (0.054) 
      Affluence t-1 1.023 (0.081)  1.057 (0.110)  1.084 (0.088)  1.142 (0.111) 
   Initial conditions            
      Poor t1 -0.303 (0.051)  -0.278 (0.065)  -0.309 (0.054)  -0.287 (0.069) 
      Affluence t1 0.759 (0.082)  0.737 (0.105)  0.836 (0.089)  0.679 (0.110) 
            
Source: Author’s calculations from the P-CASEN 2006-2009 
Notes:  Models estimated using observation for t > 1. All coefficients are significant at 1 per cent. Bold 
indicates coefficient significantly at 10 per cent different from unweighted regression in the unbalanced 
panel. 
 
Table 7 reports some summary results from unweighted and weighted estimates. Most of 
the coefficients, on the lagged variables and initial conditions, are stable across the 
balanced and unbalanced samples without weights, as well as samples with IPW and 
longitudinal weights. In only one case – the affluents’ initial conditions on the balanced 
sample with longitudinal sample -, the coefficient turns out to be statistically significant at 
10 per cent. This may suggest that longitudinal non-response does not play a significant 
role and, as a result, the attrition bias does not seem to lead to biased results of the effect 
of previous low-income/high-income position and initial conditions. Again, it is important 
to note that IPW does not correct for attrition driven by shocks between wave 𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡 
that affect both low-income/high-income and survey participation and which are 
unobserved in the last wave of observation. 
 
 





This paper studies the income position persistence in the extreme of the income 
distribution in Chile for the period 2006-2009 using the data from the P-CASEN. The 
models I have implemented allow the joint estimation of state dependence for low-income 
and high-income groups along the income distribution. It is the first time that both poverty 
persistence and affluence persistence are measured in a Latin American country.  
 
The analysis I provide addresses all these limitations from previous studies that found 
that the unequal income distribution in Chile contrasts with a high mobility of all but those 
in the high-end of the income ladder (e.g. Contreras et al., 2005; Sapelli, 2013). These 
research not only used panel data considering only three waves over a decade (P-
CASEN 1996-2001-2006), but also the analyses used simple empirical models and 
income mobility measures which have not fully exploited the longitudinal dimension of the 
data. They also did not consider the sample attrition problems which could have biased 
some of the findings obtained.  
 
My analysis provides the following findings. First, the descriptive results show that the 
persistence at the two ends of the income distribution for the Chilean case exists but is 
lower than that found in previous research. The evidence to support the thesis of a sticky 
floor that prevents people from scaling the income ladder seems to be less convincing for 
Chile. The high mobility at the bottom of the income distribution is probably related to a 
right-skewed distribution. Since the boundaries between the income quintile groups 1 to 
4 are close to each other, changes in the positions in the income distribution do not 
necessarily represent significant changes in individuals’ income.  
 
Likewise, the evidence to support the idea of affluence persistence, according to which 
high-income individuals stay put in their positions with no risk of falling, does not seem to 
be sufficiently strong in Chile either. The glass floor in Chile is much permeable than one 
would have initially thought. The turnover of this group occurs mainly between the middle-
class and the affluent category. Again, the explanation can be found in the shape of the 
income distribution. In Chile, the right tail of the income distribution is so stretched that 
those in the highest decile group may be either too close or too far from the income decile 
boundary. Those close to the income cut-off might be exposed to greater fluidity with the 
decile groups below. This suggests that a glass floor might be in a higher income cut-off 
(e.g. the affluent 5 per cent of the population). 
 
Second, the results from the econometric analysis suggest that both mechanisms true 
state dependence and heterogeneity (observable and unobservable) explain low-income 
persistence and high-income persistence. In the former mechanism, the contribution is 
more significant for the affluent than for the poor. While the poverty persistence has an 




APE of only 2 per cent, the APE in the affluence persistence is 9 percent. Therefore, past 
income position is more important in the richest groups than in the lowest part of the 
income distribution to explain current income position. 
 
Moreover, the true state dependence impact on the current income position for low-
income households appears to be low when compared to other explanatory variables. 
According to the models’ outcomes, the unobservable heterogeneity accounts for 
between 33 and 44 per cent of the unexplained variation in income position changes. 
Furthermore, the models provide evidence that the effect of the observed characteristic 
in the current low-income position has a greater impact than the genuine state 
dependence.  
 
For example, I found that the households’ labour market conditions and the human capital 
of both the household head and the household head’s partner are the variables on the 
models that have a higher APE in explaining both the lowest income quintile group 
persistence and poverty persistence. Since the inability to exit low-income is not the result 
of genuine dependence but reflects differences between the productive skills of 
households members, there is scope for policies that promote human capital to free 
households from low-income persistence. 
 
Third, while descriptive evidence shows that there is income-related attrition in the data, 
with those in the high-income initial position more likely to drop out, both the variable-
addition tests and comparison of estimates based on unweighted and weighted 
unbalanced samples show no evidence of attrition bias. This is, it does not influence the 
magnitude of the estimated effects of state dependence and initial conditions.  
 
In summary, Chile appears to be a fluid society throughout its income distribution, even 
at both ends of the distribution. While all groups are likely to move upwards in the income 
ladder, this does not ensure the sustainability of those changes over time. This is because 
the income mobility is mostly bounded to short-range movements. It is thus evidencing 
that the entire population is vulnerable to experience a downward from their positions. In 
this scenario, income mobility seems to be more related to stress or anxiety generated by 
economic uncertainty than to an improvement in the well-being of individuals. 
 
Finally, my approach to understanding the joint low-income and high-income persistence 
could offer a guide to further empirical work to other countries that have access to short-
period panel data. Thus, new research could analyse poverty persistence and affluence 
persistence from a comparative and institutional perspective. 
 
 





Table A.1: Descriptive statistics of the variables for both unbalanced and 
balanced samples (average values 2006-2006) 
       
Variables Unbalanced sample Balanced sample Balanced sample 
 (Unweighted) (Unweighted) (Longitudinal weights) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Household head characteristics       
   Female 0.294 (0.002) 0.290 (0.003) 0.303 (0.007) 
   Age 47.8 (0.079) 48.9 (0.097) 48.3 (0.215) 
   Education: Primary school 0.309 (0.003) 0.373 (0.004) 0.311 (0.007) 
   Education: Secondary school 0.524 (0.003) 0.510 (0.004) 0.525 (0.008) 
   Education: University degree 0.143 (0.002) 0.087 (0.002) 0.140 (0.008) 
   Labour status: Formal employed 0.717 (0.002) 0.706 (0.003) 0.724 (0.006) 
   Labour status: Informal employed 0.110 (0.001) 0.112 (0.002) 0.107 (0.003) 
   Labour status: Unemployed 0.017 (0.001) 0.017 (0.001) 0.016 (0.001) 
   Labour status: Inactive 0.156 (0.002) 0.166 (0.002) 0.153 (0.005) 
HH head's partner characteristics       
   Age 44.6 (0.085) 46.1 (0.106) 45.4 (0.236) 
   Education: Primary school 0.316 (0.003) 0.387 (0.005) 0.331 (0.009) 
   Education: Secondary school 0.567 (0.004) 0.530 (0.005) 0.552 (0.011) 
   Education: University degree 0.102 (0.002) 0.064 (0.002) 0.102 (0.008) 
   Labour status: Formal employed 0.312 (0.003) 0.272 (0.003) 0.310 (0.009) 
   Labour status: Informal employed 0.093 (0.002) 0.087 (0.002) 0.084 (0.004) 
   Labour status: Unemployed 0.044 (0.001) 0.041 (0.001) 0.042 (0.003) 
   Labour status: Inactive 0.551 (0.003) 0.600 (0.004) 0.564 (0.009) 
Household characteristics       
   Equivalised total household income 351,788 (2,190) 279,176 (1,564) 331,364 (8,261) 
   Household type: Couple without children 0.278 (0.002) 0.282 (0.003) 0.277 (0.007) 
   Household type: Single without children 0.127 (0.002) 0.117 (0.002) 0.127 (0.005) 
   Household type: Couple with children 0.397 (0.003) 0.411 (0.003) 0.400 (0.007) 
   Household type: Single with children 0.106 (0.002) 0.114 (0.002) 0.111 (0.004) 
   Household type: Lone person 0.093 (0.002) 0.075 (0.002) 0.085 (0.005) 
   Number of persons 3.7 (0.009) 3.9 (0.012) 3.8 (0.027) 
   Number of children < 15  0.824 (0.005) 0.864 (0.007) 0.831 (0.015) 
   Number of workers 1.357 (0.005) 1.336 (0.006) 1.346 (0.013) 
   Housing: Own housing (no mortgage) 0.543 (0.003) 0.605 (0.004) 0.544 (0.008) 
   Housing: Own housing, mortgage 0.137 (0.002) 0.123 (0.002) 0.134 (0.006) 
   Housing: Rent 0.160 (0.002) 0.102 (0.002) 0.163 (0.008) 
   Housing: Subsidized or rent free 0.159 (0.002) 0.170 (0.003) 0.159 (0.006) 
   Rural 0.122 (0.002) 0.161 (0.003) 0.127 (0.004) 
   Regions: 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th 0.111 (0.002) 0.121 (0.002) 0.111 (0.005) 
   Regions: 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th 0.471 (0.003) 0.526 (0.004) 0.477 (0.008) 
   Regions: 11th and 12th  0.038 (0.001) 0.031 (0.001) 0.016 (0.001) 
   Regions: 13th 0.381 (0.003) 0.322 (0.003) 0.396 (0.008) 
Nº individuals 30,196 18,076 18,076 
Nº households 8,079 4,693 4,693 
       
Source: Author’s calculations from the P-CASEN 2006-2009. 
Notes:  All results are rates (%) unless stated otherwise. The equivalized total household income is valued 
in terms of 2009 Chilean pesos. 




Table A.2: Annual income position at t conditional of income position at t -1 for 
unbalanced and balanced samples 
 
(1) Income quintile groups (IQGs): relative thresholds  (2) Welfare level: absolute thresholds   
           
IQGs, 
year t -1  IQGs, year t (row %) 
 Welfare,  
year t -1  Welfare, year t (row %) 
 IQG 1 IQGs 2-3-4 IQG 5 Missing   Poor 
Middle 
Class Affluent Missing 
(1.a) Balanced sample    (2.a) Balanced sample    
   IQG 1 50.0 47.4 2.6 -     Poor 36.6 62.9 0.4 - 
   IQGs 2-3-4 15.5 74.6 10.0 -     Middle class 7.9 89.0 3.1 - 
   IQG 5 4.1 38.8 57.2 -     Affluent 1.1 47.5 51.4 - 
   Total 21.3 63.1 15.5      Total 10.9 83.9 5.3  
(1.b) Unbalanced sample    (2.b) Unbalanced sample   
   IQG 1 43.3 40.9 1.9 13.88     Poor 31.8 54.6 0.4 13.26 
   IQGs 2-3-4 13.1 63.9 7.8 15.23     Middle class 6.7 74.4 2.8 16.03 
   IQG 5 2.7 28.8 39.3 29.19     Affluent 0.9 27.8 33.6 37.79 
   Total 14.0 42.3 9.8 33.9     Total 7.1 55.0 4.0 33.9 
           
Source: Author’s calculations from the P-CASEN 2006-2009. 
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